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Lecture 1 – Software Security Principles

[COSE451] Software Security

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Overview

- Definition of Security
- Basic terms

Definition of Security

- What is the definition of "computer security"?
 - Finding vulnerabilities?
 - Preventing hacking?
 - Protecting sensitive data?

Definition of Security

- Fundamental concepts of security
 - Ensuring the CIA!
 - **C**onfidentiality
 - **I**ntegrity
 - **A**vailability



Confidentiality (기밀성)

- Keeping data and resources hidden
 - Granting permission to information solely to authorized users
 - This guarantees that an attacker cannot obtain protected data



Confidentiality

Keeping data and resources hidden

- Granting permission to information solely to authorized users
- This guarantees that an attacker cannot obtain protected data



If confidentiality is broken?

- Personal information leakage, account and password leakage, etc.
- E.g., The confidential information of a user is exposed in an unencrypted text


Confidentiality

Methods to ensure confidentiality

- Cryptography
 - Encrypting data with a cryptographic key will assure confidentiality
 - Only those with the decryption key can access the contents
- Authentication
 - Proof of your identity and conduct (e.g., login process)
 - Only authorized users have access to the data


Integrity (무결성)

- Ensuring data remains unchanged (as intended)
 - Limiting the modification of information to privileged entities
 - This guarantees that an attacker cannot modify protected data



Integrity

- Ensuring data remains unchanged (as intended)
 - Limiting the modification of information to privileged entities
 - This guarantees that an attacker cannot modify protected data
- If integrity is broken?
 - The legitimate update file is replaced with a file containing malicious code, leading to subsequent malicious activities



Integrity

Methods to ensure integrity

- Authentication
 - Proof of your identity and conduct (e.g., login process)
 - Only authorized users can change the data
- Hash function
 - Using hash functions for tamper detection

5416371cc0e990871746ddaac89f1a5e *ubuntu-16.04.6-desktop-amd64.iso feefb18e7916c9a16bb09923ed98df64 *ubuntu-16.04.6-desktop-i386.iso ac8a79a86a905ebdc3ef3f5dd16b7360 *ubuntu-16.04.6-server-amd64.iso 1817138b1a181507c5ebd5ec8a3f40ba *ubuntu-16.04.6-server-i386.iso

Availability (가용성)

- Ensuring a service (or data/program) accessible
 - Prohibiting an attacker from hindering computation
 - This guarantees that legitimate uses of the service remain possible



Availability

- Ensuring a service (or data/program) accessible
 - Prohibiting an attacker from hindering computation
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- If availability is broken?
 - The legitimate user is unable to access the desired data
 - E.g., Denial of Service attacks (DoS)

Availability

Methods to ensure availability

- Data backup and replication
 - Replicating data across multiple locations to protect against issues at a single location
- Error tolerance and recovery
 - Building services that are robust and capable of quickly recovering from errors
- Monitoring
 - Monitoring resources and data

Relationship between CIA



Computer security vs Software security

Software security

- Focusing on the design, implementation, and operation of software systems,
 including the reliable enforcement of confidentiality, integrity and availability
- Can be implemented with Security Development Lifecycles (SDL), Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), and Vulnerability Disclosure Programs (VDP)

Basic terms related to software security

- Asset
- Vulnerability (vs Bug)
- Threat (vs Risk)

Asset

- All valuable things that an organization possesses
 - The things we want to protect
 - E.g., information, software, hardware, services

- Security weakness or flaw in a system, network, software, or any other entity that could be exploited by attackers
 - This can compromise the CIA of the system or its data




Example: HeartBleed vulnerability

- An extremely dangerous vulnerability discovered in OpenSSL*
- This vulnerability embedded in the OpenSSL HeartBeat
 - HeartBeat used to exchange periodic signals between the server and the client to check for any issues or to maintain a stable connection

*OpenSSL: an encryption library that enables secure communication




- Example: HeartBleed vulnerability
 - Normal case






- Example: HeartBleed vulnerability
 - Vulnerable case





- Example: HeartBleed vulnerability
 - Vulnerable case





- Example: HeartBleed vulnerability
 - Vulnerable code / security patch


```
/* Read type and payload length first */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
tq = 1q
if (s->msg callback)
        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
                &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
                s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Read type and payload length first */
if (1 + 2 + 16 > s -> s3 -> rrec.length)
        return 0; /* silently discard */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
        return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = pt
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
        unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
```

- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)
 - List of publicly known computer security vulnerabilities
 - More than 200,000 CVEs are managed
 - CVE MITRE (https://cve.mitre.org/), National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
 - CVE-YEAR-ID
 - E.g., CVE-2020-14147
 - Discovered in 2020

₩CVE-2014-0160 Detail

Description

The (1) TLS and (2) DTLS implementations in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1g do not properly handle Heartbeat Extension packets, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory via crafted packets that trigger a buffer over-read, as demonstrated by reading private keys, related to d1_both.c and t1_lib.c, aka the Heartbleed bug.



Weakness Enumeration

CWE-ID	CWE Name	Source
CWE-125	Out-of-bounds Read	NIST NIST

Known Affected Software Configurations Switch to CPE 2.2

Configuration 1 (hide)

★ cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*	From (including)	Up to (excluding)
Show Matching CPE(s)▼	1.0.1	1.0.1g

Vulnerability vs Bug

Bug

- Errors, defects, or unexpected operation of software or programs
- E.g., Type error

```
num1 = 10
num2 = '20'
result = num1 + num2 // TypeError
```

Bugs related to security issues are called vulnerabilities

Vulnerability vs Bug

Bug

Python code example that contains bugs but does not introduce vulnerabilities

```
def calculate_average(numbers):
    total = 0
    count = 0


    for number in numbers:
        total += number
        count += 1

    average = count / len(numbers)
    return average
```

Vulnerability vs Bug


Bug

Errors, defects, or unexpected operation of software or programs



Threat (위협)

- The environment that presents the potential for loss or damage
 - Potential danger or harmful events
 - E.g., The existence of vulnerabilities and hackers, lost hard drive



From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043)

Threat (위협) vs Risk (위험)


Risk


- The likelihood of potential harm or loss resulting from the exploitation of vulnerabilities by threats
- E.g., Information leakage due to vulnerability, attacks by hackers

Risk = Threat * Vulnerability * Assets

- If vulnerability does not exist, a threat cannot become a risk
- Reducing risk (risk management) is one of the important issues in security
 - E.g., Identifying vulnerabilities and remediating them

Asset, Vulnerability, Threat, and Risk





https://www.slideshare.net/mfnaqvi/asset-vulnerability-threat-risk-control https://sikkertgaute.medium.com/cybersecurity-risks-in-higher-education-part-1-background-assets-threat-events-and-threat-236365e9c3ea

Eight principles enumerated by Saltzer and Schroeder

Economy of Mechanism	Fail-safe	Complete	Open
	Defaults	Mediation	Design
Separation of Privilege	Least	Least Common	Psychological
	Privilege	Mechanism	Acceptability

J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder, "The protection of information in computer systems," *Proceedings of the IEEE*, vol. 63, no. 9, pp. 1278–1308, 1975. https://doi.org/10:1109/PROC:1975:9939

1. Economy of Mechanism

- Keep the design as simple and small as possible
- Simple implementations are easier to manually audit

2. Fail-safe Defaults

- Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion
- Malicious behaviors are difficult to enumerate and identify exhaustively

3. Complete Mediation

Every access to every object must be checked for authority

4. Open Design

- The design should not be secret
- This allows researchers and auditors to examine how security controls operate to ensure their correctness
- E.g., Open-source software itself is known to be highly secure (Google, etc.)

5. Separation of Privilege

- Maintaining separation between roles or accounts with different permissions
- E.g., to not allow users with administrator privileges to also have regular user privileges
- This increases the security of the system by allowing multiple accounts or roles to have some privileges rather than one account having all privileges

6. Least Privilege

- Strengthen system security by granting only the minimum necessary privileges to each user or process
- E.g., if an operation needs to only read some information, it should not also be granted the privileges to write or delete this information

7. Least Common Mechanism

- Minimize the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users
- Shared objects provide potentially dangerous channels for information flow and unintended interactions

8. Psychological Acceptability

- The human interface should be designed for ease of use
- The security control should be naturally usable so that users 'routinely and automatically' apply the protection

Next Lecture

Authentication