

**Please check your attendance
using Blackboard!**

Lecture 3 – Memory Safety

[COSE451] Software Security

Instructor: Seunghoon Woo

Spring 2024


Overview

- **Vulnerabilities caused by improper memory management**
- **Access controls**

Memory safety

- **Vulnerabilities caused by improper memory management**

- When we dynamically allocate memory in C/C++, it is essential to deallocate it



- If this is not done correctly, vulnerabilities can occur
 - (1) Memory Leak
 - (2) Double Free
 - (3) Use After Free

Memory safety

(1) Memory Leak

- Memory allocated but not deallocated (freed)


Allocation
(e.g., malloc)

Deallocation
(e.g., free)

```
1 /* Function with memory leak */
2 #include <stdlib.h>
3
4 void f()
5 {
6     int* ptr = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int));
7
8     /* Do some work */
9     /* Return without freeing ptr*/
10    return;
11 }
```

Memory safety

(2) Double Free



- Attempting to deallocate memory that has already been deallocated

```
1 /* Function with double-free */
2 #include <stdio.h>
3 #include <stdlib.h>
4
5 void f()
6 {
7     char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
8     /* Do Some work */
9
10    if (abrt) {
11        free(ptr);
12        /* freeing ptr */
13    }
14    ...
15    free(ptr);
16    /* freeing ptr again: double-free */
17 }
```

Memory safety

(3) Use After Free



- Attempting to access deallocated memory

```
1 /* Function with use after free */
2 #include <stdio.h>
3 #include <stdlib.h>
4
5 void f()
6 {
7     char* ptr = (char*)malloc (SIZE);
8     /* Do Some work */
9
10    if (err) {
11        abrt = 1;
12        free(ptr);
13        /* freeing ptr */
14    }
15    /* Do Some work */
16
17    if (abrt) {
18        logError("operation aborted before commit", ptr);
19        /* access deallocated memory ptr: use after free */
20    }
21 }
```

Memory safety

- **These vulnerabilities are related to memory management and are dangerous problems that threaten the **stability** and **security****
 - Memory corruption
 - Data leak
 - Memory manipulation
 - Decrease system performance
 - Shell code injection

Memory safety

- **It seems that the issue can be easily resolved by simply mapping allocation (e.g., malloc) and free (e.g., free) statements correctly**

Memory safety

- **It seems that the issue can be easily resolved by simply mapping allocation (e.g., malloc) and free (e.g., free) statements correctly**
 - **FALSE**
 - Many developers are still fighting with this issue

Memory safety

- **Example: Linux kernel case**

- Original code

- Can you find where the problem is?


```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ... // use in, out
4  free(out);
5  free(in);
6
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9
10     goto err;
11 }
12
13 out = malloc(2);
14 if (out == NULL) {
15     free(in);
16
17     goto err;
18 }
19 ... // use in, out
20 err:
21     free(in);
22     free(out);
23     return;
```

Memory

- **Example: Linux kernel case**

- First patch (2007. 09)
 - The existing problem was solved,
but the root cause was not resolved

```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ... // use in, out
4  free(out);
5  free(in);
6
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9
10     goto err;
11 }
12
13 out = malloc(2);
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23     return;
```




```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ...
4  free(out);
5  free(in);
6
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9     out = NULL; // +
10    goto err;
11 }
12
13 out = malloc(2);
14 if (out == NULL) {
15     free(in);
16     in = NULL; // +
17     goto err;
18 }
19 ...
20 err:
21     free(in);
22     free(out);
23     return;
```

Memory

- **Example: Linux kernel case**

- Second patch (2008.06)
 - Can you find where the problem is?

```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ...
4  free(out);
5  free(in);
6
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9      out = NULL; // +
10     goto err;
11 }
12
13 out = malloc(2);
14 if (out == NULL) {
15     free(in);
16     in = NULL; // +
17     goto err;
18 }
19 ...
20 err:
21     free(in);
22     free(out);
23     return;
```



```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ...
4  // -
5  free(in);
6
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9      out = NULL;
10     goto err;
11 }
12 free(out); // +
13 out = malloc(2);
14 if (out == NULL) {
15     free(in);
16     in = NULL;
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19 ...
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```


Memory

- **Example: Linux kernel case**

- Third patch (2008. 07)

- The existing problem was solved, but the code becomes even more redundant and confusable

```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ...
4  // -
5  free(in);
6
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9      out = NULL;
10     goto err;
11 }
12 free(out); // +
13 out = malloc(2);
14 if (out == NULL) {
15     free(in);
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19 ...
20 err:
21     free(in);
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```



```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ...
4  free(out); // +
5  free(in);
6  out = NULL; // +
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9      out = NULL;
10     goto err;
11 }
12 // -
13 out = malloc(2);
14 if (out == NULL) {
15     free(in);
16     in = NULL;
17     goto err;
18 }
19 ...
20 err:
21     free(in);
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Memory

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```
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5  free(in);
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8  if (in == NULL) {
9      out = NULL;
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11 }
```

```
13  out = malloc(2);
14  if (out == NULL) {
15      free(in);
16      in = NULL;
17      goto err;
18  }
19  ...
20  err:
21      free(in);
22      free(out);
23      return;
```

```
1  in = malloc(1);
2  out = malloc(1);
3  ...
4  free(out); // +
5  free(in);
6  out = NULL; // +
7  in = malloc(2);
8  if (in == NULL) {
9      out = NULL;
10     goto err;
11 }
```

This is not an easy problem and must be managed carefully!

```
13  out = malloc(2);
14  if (out == NULL) {
15      free(in);
16      in = NULL;
17      goto err;
18  }
19  ...
20  err:
21      free(in);
22      free(out);
23      return;
```

Lecture 4 – Access Controls

[COSE451] Software Security

Instructor: Seunghoon Woo

Spring 2024

Access Controls

- **A process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted only by authorized entities**
 - The process of determining whether a resource is available in a system



Authentication

Who you are




Authorization

What you can do

- Whereas authorization policies define what an individual identity or group may access, access controls are the methods we use to enforce such policies

Access Controls




Access Controls

- **The central element of computer security**
 - To prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to resources,
 - To prevent legitimate users from accessing resources in an unauthorized manner
 - To enable legitimate users to access resources in an authorized manner

Access Controls

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 - To enable legitimate users to access resources in an authorized manner



<https://www.learn2torials.com/a/linux-access-control-list>

Access Controls

- **Basic elements of access control**

1. Subject

- An entity capable of accessing objects
- E.g., owner, group, world

2. Object

- A resource to which access is controlled
- E.g., page, file, directory, message, program

3. Access right

- Describes the way in which a subject may access an object
- E.g., read, write, execute, delete, create, search

Access Controls

- **Access controls in Unix file system**
 - File permissions with the user-group-others model
 - User
 - Indicating the userid (UID) of the file owner
 - Group
 - Indicating the groupid (GID) of the file
 - Others
 - Public

Access Controls


- **Access controls in Unix file system**

- Three protection bits for each of user, group, and others
 1. Read (R)
 - The file contents can be read
 2. Write (W)
 - The file contents can be modified
 3. Execute (X)
 - A file can be run

Access Controls

- **Access controls in Unix file system**
 - Display for file permission: 10-char string

Type	User			Group			Others		
	R	W	X	R	W	X	R	W	X



Access Controls

- **Access controls in Unix file system**

Symbolic notation	Numeric notation	Description
-----	0000	no permissions
-rwx-----	0700	read, write, & execute only for owner
-rwxrwx---	0770	read, write, & execute for owner and group
-rwxrwxrwx	0777	read, write, & execute for owner, group and others
---x--x--x	0111	execute
--w--w--w-	0222	write
--wx-wx-wx	0333	write & execute
-r--r--r--	0444	read
-r-xr-xr-x	0555	read & execute
-rw-rw-rw-	0666	read & write
-rwxr-----	0740	owner can read, write, & execute; group can only read; others have no permissions

Access Controls

- **Access control policies**
 1. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
 2. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
 3. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
 4. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

Access Controls

1. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

- Traditional method of implementing access control
- Owner or administrator of resources grants access permissions to other users without the intervention of a security manager
- Controls access based on the (1) **identity of the requestor** and on (2) **access rules** stating what requestors are (or are not) allowed to do
- Easy to implement and simple to use, but not highly secure

Access Controls

1. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

- Access matrix

		OBJECTS			
		File 1	File 2	File 3	File 4
SUBJECTS	User A	Own Read Write		Own Read Write	
	User B	Read	Own Read Write	Write	Read
	User C	Read Write	Read		Own Read Write

(a) Access matrix

Access Controls

2. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

- Enforcing restrictions on a low-security-level entity from accessing high-security-level objects
 - E.g., membership grading system in a cafe or community
 - Each member (subject) is assigned a security level
 - There are specified permission levels for accessing each bulletin board (object)
- Even if one is the owner of an object, without being granted the security level to access that object, one cannot access it
- Highly secure, but complex configuration
 - Access control cannot be applied differently for each subject
 - Permission levels must be set for all subjects and objects one by one

Access Controls


3. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

- Granting permissions to **role groups** rather than individual users
- Controlling access by assigning roles to users
- Commonly used in services based on job roles

Access Controls

3. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

- Users assigned to different Roles according to their responsibilities
- Users-to-Roles are Many-to-Many
- Users may change frequently



Access Controls

4. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

- Controlling access by describing conditions based on the **attributes** of objects and subjects
 - E.g., To access “File 1”, users must have the “admin” tag attached to their type attribute
- Attributes
 - E.g., Subject name, resource types, and current time
- Typically used in conjunction with RBAC to manage permissions more finely

Access Controls

4. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

- Example

```
{
  "bindings": [{
    "role": "roles/testRole",
    "members": [
      "user:developer@s-core.co.kr"
    ],
    "condition": {
      "title": "DateTime Expires",
      "description": "Expires at noon on 2021-12-31 UTC",
      "expression": " request.time < timestamp(' 2021-12-31T12:00:00Z ')"
    }
  ]
}
```

Access Controls and Software Security


- **Improper access control can lead to software vulnerabilities**

- CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (8)
- CWE-264: Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
- CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management (22)
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control
- CWE-285: Improper Authorization
- CWE-862: Missing Authorization (11)
- CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (24)

* **Highlighted** numbers: the rankings of the top 25 most dangerous Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entries in 2023

Access Controls and Software Security

- Improper access control can lead to software vulnerabilities
 - Example: CVE-2023-4696



```
server/jwt.go
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ func JWTMiddleware(server *Server, next echo.HandlerFunc, secret string) echo.Ha
111 111         }
112 112         return nil, errors.Errorf("unexpected access token kid=%v", t.Header["kid"])
113 113     })
114 +
115 +     if !accessToken.Valid {
116 +         return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid access token.")
117 +     }
118 +
114 119     if !audienceContains(claims.Audience, auth.AccessTokenAudienceName) {
115 120         return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid access to
116 121     }
```

Access Controls and Software Security

- **Privilege escalation**

- Gaining **unauthorized permissions** within a system, network, or application
 - E.g., gain root privileges
- This can be achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities to bypass security measures that prevent the user from accessing certain types of information

Access Controls and Software Security

- **Privilege escalation**

- **Vertical**

- An attempt to access the highest level account from the lowest level privileged account in a multi-level privilege structure

- **Horizontal**

- An attempt to elevate privileges and moves laterally to access the functions or data of another user at the same level

Access Controls and Software Security

- **Privilege escalation**

- Demo: Windows privilege escalation attack
 - Exploiting CVE-2017-0213 vulnerability
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f6x0hBerObM>

Next Lecture

- **Software vulnerabilities**